What types of signs of life does one need when slaughtering an animal that is on the verge of death? At what point of the slaughtering process does one need to see signs of life? Can one slaughter an animal for an idol worshipper? Does one need to be concerned that it will be used for idol worship and therefore the Jew is benefitting from idol worship?
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sara Averick in loving memory of her mother, Leah Shifrin Averick, לאה בת יהודה לייב חייקל וחיה מאשה. “She infused her many descendants with her love for Torah, Israel and the Jewish people.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Ellen Cherrick in loving memory of her mother, Udy Katz Cherrick, z”l, on her 13th yahrzeit.
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Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Sara Averick in loving memory of her mother, Leah Shifrin Averick, לאה בת יהודה לייב חייקל וחיה מאשה. “She infused her many descendants with her love for Torah, Israel and the Jewish people.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Ellen Cherrick in loving memory of her mother, Udy Katz Cherrick, z”l, on her 13th yahrzeit.
Chullin 38
גּוֹעָה וְהֵטִילָה רֶיעִי וְכִשְׁכְּשָׁה בְּאׇזְנָהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּא לְאֹזוֹזֵי אוּנֵּי, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ [עוֹשָׂה] דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה.
If the animal lows, or excreted excrement, or wiggled its ear during the slaughter, that is a convulsion, and the slaughter renders eating the flesh of the animal permitted. Shmuel said to them: Is it necessary according to Abba, i.e., Rav, for the animal to move its ears during the slaughter, which requires a considerable life force? As I say: Any movements of the animal that are not matters that the death of the animal engenders are convulsions sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
מַאי נִינְהוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה? אָמַר רַב עָנָן: לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל – הָיְתָה יָדָהּ כְּפוּפָה וּפְשָׁטַתָּה – דָּבָר שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשֶׂה, פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה – דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין הַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה.
The Gemara asks: What are matters that the death of the animal engenders? Rav Anan said: This was explained to me from Master Shmuel himself: If the animal’s foreleg was bent, and the animal straightened it, that is a matter that the death of the animal engenders. But if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it, that is among the matters that the death of the animal does not engender and is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ; הָא הֶחְזִירָה – כְּשֵׁרָה.
The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us with that statement? We already learn in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that during its slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is nothing other than part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. But one may infer that if the animal does restore its foreleg to the bent position, that indicates life and the slaughter is valid.
אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דַּוְקָא דְּכַיְיפָה וּפָשְׁטָה וַהֲדַר כָּיְיפָה לַהּ, אֲבָל פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה – לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: If the halakha is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that it is specifically in a case where the animal’s foreleg had been bent, and the animal now straightens it and then bends it, that the slaughter is valid. But if the foreleg had been straight and the animal bent it, the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it; that is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
מֵיתִיבִי: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: גּוֹעָה בִּשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה – אֵין זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשְּׁמוֹ: אֲפִילּוּ הֵטִילָה רֶיעִי וְכִשְׁכְּשָׁה בִּזְנָבָהּ – אֵין זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. קַשְׁיָא גּוֹעָה אַגּוֹעָה, קַשְׁיָא רֶיעִי אַרֶיעִי!
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to Rav’s statement cited earlier. Rabbi Yosei says that Rabbi Meir would say: If an animal lows during its slaughter, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Even if the animal excreted excrement or wagged its tail, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. The Gemara now clarifies: Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the baraita that if an animal lows it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal lows it is a convulsion. And Rabbi Elazar’s statement in the baraita that if an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion.
גּוֹעָה אַגּוֹעָה לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּעָבֵי קָלַהּ, הָא דְּעָמֵי קָלַהּ. רֶיעִי אַרֶיעִי נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּשׁוֹתֶתֶת, כָּאן בְּמַתְרֶזֶת.
The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal lows it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal lows it is not a convulsion is not difficult. This opinion, that it is a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is rich and powerful, a clear indication of life; that opinion, that it is not a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is muted, which is not an indication of life. The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion is also not difficult. Here, the opinion that it is not a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement in a trickle. That is not an indication of life. There, the opinion that it is a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement with force. That is an indication of life.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה. מַאי בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה? בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה, לְאַפּוֹקֵי תְּחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה דְּלָא.
§ The Gemara continues its definition of convulsion that indicates life. Rav Ḥisda said: I was taught that the convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: What is the meaning of: At the conclusion of the act of slaughter? It means even in the midst of the slaughter. The Sages said that it must be at the conclusion of the slaughter only to exclude convulsions at the beginning of the act of slaughter, which are not an indication of life.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה. אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, כֹּל הָכִי תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה?
Rav Ḥisda said: From where do I say that a convulsion in the midst of the act of slaughter is an indication of life? It is from the mishna, as we learned: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: When did the animal extend its foreleg but not restore it? If we say that it occurred at the conclusion of the slaughter, must the animal continue living for so extended a period that it restores its leg to its bent position after the slaughter is complete? Is the slaughter truly not valid otherwise? Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg in the middle of the slaughter? If so, then when it restores its leg as well, it is considered a convulsion that indicates life.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשֶׂה כֵּן בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנִּשְׁמָתָהּ נְטוּלָה הֵימֶנָּה קוֹדֶם לָכֵן.
Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: That is no proof. Actually, one could explain that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg but did not restore it to the bent position at the conclusion of the slaughter, as I say with regard to any animal that does not do so at the conclusion of the slaughter, it is known that its soul was taken from it before that moment, and it was not alive.
רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּלַּיְלָה, וּלְמָחָר מָצָא כְּתָלִים מְלֵאִים דָּם – כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁזִּינְּקָה, וּכְמִדַּת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית שְׁחִיטָה שָׁנִינוּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה זִינְּקָה.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explained further and said: From where do I say that this is so? It is from the mishna, as we learned that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And Shmuel said with regard to the walls mentioned in the statement of Rabbi Shimon: It is the walls of the place of the slaughter, i.e., the walls of the neck, not the walls of the house, that we learned. Granted, if you say that a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter is an indication of life, this works out well. But if you say that a convulsion is an indication of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, let us be concerned that perhaps the blood spurted onto the walls of the neck at the beginning of the act of slaughter, and there was no indication of life.
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי זִינּוּק, דַּעֲדִיף.
The Gemara rejects that proof. But perhaps spurting is different, as it is superior as an indication of life to extending or bending a foreleg, and therefore, although extending or bending a foreleg is a sufficient indicator of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, spurting is a sufficient indicator even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.
וּמִי עֲדִיף? וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דַּיָּיהּ אִם זִינְּקָה, קַל מִדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וַעֲדִיף מִדְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara asks: And is spurting superior? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says it is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck, indicating that spurting of blood is a less substantive indication of life than those indications mentioned in the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer’s requirement of spurting is less substantive than the requirements of Rabban Gamliel as an indication of life, but superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life, where the Rabbis require that the animal convulse either with its foreleg or with its hind leg.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אָמַר לִי סַמָּא בַּר חִילְקַאי, אַקְשִׁי בַּהּ אֲבוּהּ דְּבַר אַבּוּבְרָם, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אֲחוּהּ דְּבַר אַבּוּבְרָם: וּמִדְּרַבָּנַן מִי עֲדִיף? וְהָא תְּנַן: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁתְּפַרְכֵּס אוֹ בַיָּד אוֹ בָרֶגֶל.
Ravina said: Samma bar Ḥilkai said to me that the father of bar Abuveram, and some say that it was the brother of bar Abuveram, raises a difficulty: And is blood spurting superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail?
רַבָּנַן אַהֵי קָיְימִי? אִילֵּימָא אַדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – ״כֵּיוָן שֶׁפִּירְכְּסָה״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Ravina elaborates: To which statement of the tanna’im in the mishna do the Rabbis stand and respond? If we say that they are responding to the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulsed with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wagged its tail, indicating that this is sufficient.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא אַדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאִי עֲדִיף, מַאי ״עַד״?
Rather, it is obvious that the Rabbis are responding to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And if Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is superior to that of the Rabbis as an indication of life, what is the meaning of: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail? In that case too, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail. Apparently, blood spurting is a less substantive indication of life, and the proof of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak remains valid: If spurting at the beginning of the act of slaughter is a sufficient indication of life to render the slaughter valid, then all the more so, extending and bending a limb are also sufficient indications of life.
רָבָא אָמַר: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״שׁוֹר
Rava said: The convulsion that the Rabbis said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the case? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27). The phrase “a bull
אוֹ כֶשֶׂב״ – פְּרָט לְכִלְאַיִם, ״אוֹ עֵז״ – פְּרָט לְנִדְמֶה, ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ – פְּרָט לְיוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן, ״שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״ – פְּרָט לִמְחוּסַּר זְמַן, ״תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״ – פְּרָט לַיָּתוֹם.
or a sheep” is to the exclusion of an animal born to parents of diverse kinds, which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase “or a goat” is to the exclusion of an animal that resembles another species of animal. “When it is born”; this is to the exclusion of an animal born by caesarean section. “It shall be seven days”; this is to the exclusion of an animal whose time has not yet arrived. “Under its mother”; this is to the exclusion of an animal that is an orphan.
הַאי יָתוֹם הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּילִידְתֵּיהּ אִמֵּיהּ וַהֲדַר מִתָה, לְעוֹלָם תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא דְּמִתָה וַהֲדַר יְלִידְתֵּיהּ, מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא.
Rava elaborates: What are the circumstances of this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, this is unreasonable. Will the mother continue living forever? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where the mother died and then gave birth to it. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice is derived from the phrase: “When it is born,” since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, זֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְמִיתָה וְזֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְחַיִּים. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה – הַיְינוּ דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה, לְמָה לֵיהּ? מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא!
Rather, it is obvious that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point this mother withdrew for death and that newborn withdrew for life. Granted, if you say that we require life at the conclusion of the birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude the orphan. But if you say that we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, why is this verse necessary to exclude it? It can be derived from the phrase: “When it is born.” It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא – בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה, פְּסוּלָה.
§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rava says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion expressed in this baraita: The slaughter of a small animal that extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid.
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בַּיָּד, אֲבָל בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּדַקָּה, אֲבָל בְּגַסָּה, בֵּין בַּיָּד בֵּין בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. וְעוֹף, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא רִפְרֵף אֶלָּא גַּפּוֹ, וְלֹא כִּשְׁכֵּשׁ אֶלָּא זְנָבוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס.
The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, about extending the foreleg, said? It is with regard to a small animal. But with regard to a large animal, whether the convulsion involves its foreleg or its hind leg, and whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. And with regard to a bird, even if it fluttered [rifref] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion and an indication of life.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? כּוּלְּהוּ תְּנַנְהִי! בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ. יָד – אִין, רֶגֶל – לָא; דַּקָּה – אִין, גַּסָּה – לָא. עוֹף אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּלָא תְּנַן.
The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us in ruling in accordance with the baraita? He is teaching us all of those halakhot we learned in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of a foreleg alone, yes, it is not an indication of life, but movement of a hind leg, no, it is an indication of life. With regard to a small animal, yes, this is the halakha; with regard to a large animal, no, this is not the halakha, and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to teach the halakha in the baraita with regard to a bird, as we did not learn it in the mishna.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנׇכְרִי – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ לֶאֱכוֹל לְנׇכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [meḥatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
גְּמָ׳ הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מְפַגְּלִין.
GEMARA: In explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: These tanna’im hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, and not only the priest, render an offering piggul by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship.
מִיהוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִי שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא אָמְרִינַן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אָמְרִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד לָא אָמְרִינַן.
But the first tanna holds that if we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, yes, his intent invalidates the slaughter, and if the gentile did not voice his intent before us, his intent does not invalidate the slaughter, as we do not say that the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as we say the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even though we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, in a case where this owner has intent for idol worship and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בִּדְשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב פְּלִיגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בִּפְנִים, אֲבָל בְּחוּץ לֹא, חוּץ מִפְּנִים
There are those who say an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is with regard to a case where we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship that the tanna’im disagree. The first tanna holds that when we say in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, this statement applies only inside the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. But with regard to non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple, the intent of the owner does not invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple,
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Chullin 38
גּוֹעָה וְהֵטִילָה רֶיעִי וְכִשְׁכְּשָׁה בְּאׇזְנָהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּא לְאֹזוֹזֵי אוּנֵּי, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ [עוֹשָׂה] דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה.
If the animal lows, or excreted excrement, or wiggled its ear during the slaughter, that is a convulsion, and the slaughter renders eating the flesh of the animal permitted. Shmuel said to them: Is it necessary according to Abba, i.e., Rav, for the animal to move its ears during the slaughter, which requires a considerable life force? As I say: Any movements of the animal that are not matters that the death of the animal engenders are convulsions sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
מַאי נִינְהוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה? אָמַר רַב עָנָן: לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל – הָיְתָה יָדָהּ כְּפוּפָה וּפְשָׁטַתָּה – דָּבָר שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשֶׂה, פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה – דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין הַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה.
The Gemara asks: What are matters that the death of the animal engenders? Rav Anan said: This was explained to me from Master Shmuel himself: If the animal’s foreleg was bent, and the animal straightened it, that is a matter that the death of the animal engenders. But if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it, that is among the matters that the death of the animal does not engender and is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ; הָא הֶחְזִירָה – כְּשֵׁרָה.
The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us with that statement? We already learn in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that during its slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is nothing other than part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. But one may infer that if the animal does restore its foreleg to the bent position, that indicates life and the slaughter is valid.
אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דַּוְקָא דְּכַיְיפָה וּפָשְׁטָה וַהֲדַר כָּיְיפָה לַהּ, אֲבָל פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה – לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: If the halakha is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that it is specifically in a case where the animal’s foreleg had been bent, and the animal now straightens it and then bends it, that the slaughter is valid. But if the foreleg had been straight and the animal bent it, the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it; that is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
מֵיתִיבִי: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: גּוֹעָה בִּשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה – אֵין זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשְּׁמוֹ: אֲפִילּוּ הֵטִילָה רֶיעִי וְכִשְׁכְּשָׁה בִּזְנָבָהּ – אֵין זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. קַשְׁיָא גּוֹעָה אַגּוֹעָה, קַשְׁיָא רֶיעִי אַרֶיעִי!
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to Rav’s statement cited earlier. Rabbi Yosei says that Rabbi Meir would say: If an animal lows during its slaughter, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Even if the animal excreted excrement or wagged its tail, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. The Gemara now clarifies: Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the baraita that if an animal lows it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal lows it is a convulsion. And Rabbi Elazar’s statement in the baraita that if an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion.
גּוֹעָה אַגּוֹעָה לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּעָבֵי קָלַהּ, הָא דְּעָמֵי קָלַהּ. רֶיעִי אַרֶיעִי נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּשׁוֹתֶתֶת, כָּאן בְּמַתְרֶזֶת.
The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal lows it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal lows it is not a convulsion is not difficult. This opinion, that it is a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is rich and powerful, a clear indication of life; that opinion, that it is not a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is muted, which is not an indication of life. The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion is also not difficult. Here, the opinion that it is not a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement in a trickle. That is not an indication of life. There, the opinion that it is a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement with force. That is an indication of life.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה. מַאי בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה? בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה, לְאַפּוֹקֵי תְּחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה דְּלָא.
§ The Gemara continues its definition of convulsion that indicates life. Rav Ḥisda said: I was taught that the convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: What is the meaning of: At the conclusion of the act of slaughter? It means even in the midst of the slaughter. The Sages said that it must be at the conclusion of the slaughter only to exclude convulsions at the beginning of the act of slaughter, which are not an indication of life.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה. אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, כֹּל הָכִי תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה?
Rav Ḥisda said: From where do I say that a convulsion in the midst of the act of slaughter is an indication of life? It is from the mishna, as we learned: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: When did the animal extend its foreleg but not restore it? If we say that it occurred at the conclusion of the slaughter, must the animal continue living for so extended a period that it restores its leg to its bent position after the slaughter is complete? Is the slaughter truly not valid otherwise? Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg in the middle of the slaughter? If so, then when it restores its leg as well, it is considered a convulsion that indicates life.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשֶׂה כֵּן בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנִּשְׁמָתָהּ נְטוּלָה הֵימֶנָּה קוֹדֶם לָכֵן.
Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: That is no proof. Actually, one could explain that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg but did not restore it to the bent position at the conclusion of the slaughter, as I say with regard to any animal that does not do so at the conclusion of the slaughter, it is known that its soul was taken from it before that moment, and it was not alive.
רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּלַּיְלָה, וּלְמָחָר מָצָא כְּתָלִים מְלֵאִים דָּם – כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁזִּינְּקָה, וּכְמִדַּת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית שְׁחִיטָה שָׁנִינוּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה זִינְּקָה.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explained further and said: From where do I say that this is so? It is from the mishna, as we learned that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And Shmuel said with regard to the walls mentioned in the statement of Rabbi Shimon: It is the walls of the place of the slaughter, i.e., the walls of the neck, not the walls of the house, that we learned. Granted, if you say that a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter is an indication of life, this works out well. But if you say that a convulsion is an indication of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, let us be concerned that perhaps the blood spurted onto the walls of the neck at the beginning of the act of slaughter, and there was no indication of life.
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי זִינּוּק, דַּעֲדִיף.
The Gemara rejects that proof. But perhaps spurting is different, as it is superior as an indication of life to extending or bending a foreleg, and therefore, although extending or bending a foreleg is a sufficient indicator of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, spurting is a sufficient indicator even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.
וּמִי עֲדִיף? וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דַּיָּיהּ אִם זִינְּקָה, קַל מִדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וַעֲדִיף מִדְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara asks: And is spurting superior? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says it is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck, indicating that spurting of blood is a less substantive indication of life than those indications mentioned in the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer’s requirement of spurting is less substantive than the requirements of Rabban Gamliel as an indication of life, but superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life, where the Rabbis require that the animal convulse either with its foreleg or with its hind leg.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אָמַר לִי סַמָּא בַּר חִילְקַאי, אַקְשִׁי בַּהּ אֲבוּהּ דְּבַר אַבּוּבְרָם, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אֲחוּהּ דְּבַר אַבּוּבְרָם: וּמִדְּרַבָּנַן מִי עֲדִיף? וְהָא תְּנַן: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁתְּפַרְכֵּס אוֹ בַיָּד אוֹ בָרֶגֶל.
Ravina said: Samma bar Ḥilkai said to me that the father of bar Abuveram, and some say that it was the brother of bar Abuveram, raises a difficulty: And is blood spurting superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail?
רַבָּנַן אַהֵי קָיְימִי? אִילֵּימָא אַדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – ״כֵּיוָן שֶׁפִּירְכְּסָה״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
Ravina elaborates: To which statement of the tanna’im in the mishna do the Rabbis stand and respond? If we say that they are responding to the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulsed with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wagged its tail, indicating that this is sufficient.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא אַדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאִי עֲדִיף, מַאי ״עַד״?
Rather, it is obvious that the Rabbis are responding to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And if Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is superior to that of the Rabbis as an indication of life, what is the meaning of: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail? In that case too, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail. Apparently, blood spurting is a less substantive indication of life, and the proof of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak remains valid: If spurting at the beginning of the act of slaughter is a sufficient indication of life to render the slaughter valid, then all the more so, extending and bending a limb are also sufficient indications of life.
רָבָא אָמַר: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״שׁוֹר
Rava said: The convulsion that the Rabbis said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the case? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27). The phrase “a bull
אוֹ כֶשֶׂב״ – פְּרָט לְכִלְאַיִם, ״אוֹ עֵז״ – פְּרָט לְנִדְמֶה, ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ – פְּרָט לְיוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן, ״שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״ – פְּרָט לִמְחוּסַּר זְמַן, ״תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״ – פְּרָט לַיָּתוֹם.
or a sheep” is to the exclusion of an animal born to parents of diverse kinds, which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase “or a goat” is to the exclusion of an animal that resembles another species of animal. “When it is born”; this is to the exclusion of an animal born by caesarean section. “It shall be seven days”; this is to the exclusion of an animal whose time has not yet arrived. “Under its mother”; this is to the exclusion of an animal that is an orphan.
הַאי יָתוֹם הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּילִידְתֵּיהּ אִמֵּיהּ וַהֲדַר מִתָה, לְעוֹלָם תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא דְּמִתָה וַהֲדַר יְלִידְתֵּיהּ, מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא.
Rava elaborates: What are the circumstances of this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, this is unreasonable. Will the mother continue living forever? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where the mother died and then gave birth to it. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice is derived from the phrase: “When it is born,” since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section.
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, זֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְמִיתָה וְזֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְחַיִּים. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה – הַיְינוּ דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה, לְמָה לֵיהּ? מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא!
Rather, it is obvious that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point this mother withdrew for death and that newborn withdrew for life. Granted, if you say that we require life at the conclusion of the birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude the orphan. But if you say that we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, why is this verse necessary to exclude it? It can be derived from the phrase: “When it is born.” It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא – בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה, פְּסוּלָה.
§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rava says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion expressed in this baraita: The slaughter of a small animal that extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid.
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בַּיָּד, אֲבָל בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּדַקָּה, אֲבָל בְּגַסָּה, בֵּין בַּיָּד בֵּין בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. וְעוֹף, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא רִפְרֵף אֶלָּא גַּפּוֹ, וְלֹא כִּשְׁכֵּשׁ אֶלָּא זְנָבוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס.
The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, about extending the foreleg, said? It is with regard to a small animal. But with regard to a large animal, whether the convulsion involves its foreleg or its hind leg, and whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. And with regard to a bird, even if it fluttered [rifref] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion and an indication of life.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? כּוּלְּהוּ תְּנַנְהִי! בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ. יָד – אִין, רֶגֶל – לָא; דַּקָּה – אִין, גַּסָּה – לָא. עוֹף אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּלָא תְּנַן.
The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us in ruling in accordance with the baraita? He is teaching us all of those halakhot we learned in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of a foreleg alone, yes, it is not an indication of life, but movement of a hind leg, no, it is an indication of life. With regard to a small animal, yes, this is the halakha; with regard to a large animal, no, this is not the halakha, and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to teach the halakha in the baraita with regard to a bird, as we did not learn it in the mishna.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנׇכְרִי – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ לֶאֱכוֹל לְנׇכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [meḥatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
גְּמָ׳ הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מְפַגְּלִין.
GEMARA: In explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: These tanna’im hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, and not only the priest, render an offering piggul by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship.
מִיהוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִי שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא אָמְרִינַן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אָמְרִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד לָא אָמְרִינַן.
But the first tanna holds that if we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, yes, his intent invalidates the slaughter, and if the gentile did not voice his intent before us, his intent does not invalidate the slaughter, as we do not say that the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as we say the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even though we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, in a case where this owner has intent for idol worship and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בִּדְשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב פְּלִיגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בִּפְנִים, אֲבָל בְּחוּץ לֹא, חוּץ מִפְּנִים
There are those who say an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is with regard to a case where we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship that the tanna’im disagree. The first tanna holds that when we say in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, this statement applies only inside the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. But with regard to non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple, the intent of the owner does not invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple,
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